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Abstract
Security of the SHA-3 Candidates
Keccak and Blue Midnight Wish:
Zero-sum Property
Liliya Andreicheva
Supervising Professor: Stanisław P. Radziszowski
The SHA-3 competition for the new cryptographic standard was initiated by National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2007. In the following years, the event grew to
one of the top areas currently being researched by the CS and cryptographic communities.
The first objective of this thesis is to overview, analyse, and critique the SHA-3 competi-
tion. The second one is to perform an in-depth study of the security of two candidate hash
functions, the finalist Keccak and the second round candidate Blue Midnight Wish. The
study shall primarily focus on zero-sum distinguishers. First we attempt to attack reduced
versions of these hash functions and see if any vulnerabilities can be detected. This is fol-
lowed by attacks on their full versions. In the process, a novel approach is utilized in the
search of zero-sum distinguishers by employing SAT solvers. We conclude that while such
complex attacks can theoretically uncover undesired properties of the two hash functions
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Security, and especially computer security, is one of the most important challenges in the
modern world. Computer security can be defined by three simple terms: confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. In short, the idea is to protect all resources from unauthorized
access and multiple attacks, while keeping them available for all authorized users. This
is a rather simple task, in the case of a single individual working on his/her PC, however
problems arise the moment an Internet connection is established. Due to direct exposure,
all possible threats should be seriously considered in a network environment.
One of the fundamental areas in computer security, which is a way of helping us pro-
tect our data and our Internet connection, is cryptography. It contains several sub-areas:
symmetric-key cryptography, public-key cryptography, etc. One of the most interesting
and growing areas of cryptography is hashing. The hash function standard plays an impor-
tant role in the problems of the modern security. Cryptographic hash functions are used in
many applications, for example, digital signatures, message authentication codes (MACs)
and other forms of authentication. In addition, they can be used in indexing hash tables,
computing checksums, fingerprinting etc. The choice of a secure hash function is crucial.
The current standards SHA-1 and SHA-2 perform well, however, a constant threat exists,
for example, the enormous progress in computational abilities of the modern computers and
supercomputers, which can disarm some hash functions. The issue here are attacks on the
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standards; for example, the significant attack on SHA-1 or the attack on MD-5 presented
by Wang in 2005. These facts make the functions unstable or unreliable, which leads to the
conclusion that the standards need to be updated and optimized.
In 2007 the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a contest
for the new standard, SHA-3. We are currently approaching the final stage of the competi-
tion and within the next year the final decision is expected. According to the importance of
the area and the current interest on this topic inside the computer security community, we
decided to work on this subject for this master’s thesis.
1.2 Our Contributions
Before studying in particular about two SHA-3 candidate funtions, we are introducing
in general the area. We begin by providing an overview of the history of the SHA-3 com-
petition. The thesis work has several goals. The first objective is to overview, analyse and
critique the SHA-3 competition. The second one is to perform an in-depth study of the se-
curity of two candidate hash functions, the finalist Keccak and the second round candidate
Blue Midnight Wish. The study shall primarily focus on zero-sum distinguishers, which is
one of the new ideas in cryptanalysis. First, we attempt to attack reduced versions of these
hash functions and see if any vulnerabilities can be detected. This is followed by attacks
on their full versions. This research approach allows us to find out how the complexity
of search increases and are there any dependencies between the different parameters, that
we can vary in the algorithm. In the process, a novel approach is utilized in the search of
zero-sum distinguishers by employing SAT solvers.
Finally, we describe the attack on the presented functions, providing the experiments
and the achieved results. The attack is presented by the generic algorithm for zero-sum
distinguishers. We provide the full description of the algorithm and then the experimental
part. We also discuss possible future work on this topic.
3
1.3 Overview
In Chapter 2 we give general definitions necessary for the understanding of the particular
cryptographic research area. Next, we provide an overview of the history of the SHA-3
competition. Chapter 3 describes the background of the SHA-3 competition and gives the
overview of the first stages. The finalist of the contest Keccak is presented in Chapter 4,
with related research currently performed on this function. Chapter 5 describes another
candidate function Blue Midnight Wish in the same manner. In Chapter 6, we discuss
the general idea of the attack and the use of different SAT solvers as a tool to complete
zero-sum distinguishers attack. Chapter 7 describes the experiments and achieved results.





Before we begin the overview of the selected hash functions, we need to specify their
definitions and properties. First, we observe the idea behind the hash functions. The easiest
comparison will be the fingerprints, which are unique for every human, thus there can not
be any repeting values. Hash functions are providing a mechanism of obtaining unique
fingerprints of data, with such a property that if the data is changed, the value of the function
will be changed.
A hash function is a mathematical function, that converts some data into a fixed length
string of characters.
A cryptographic hash function is usually represented by the algorithm, which will also
return a fixed-sized bit-string for a given message, such that any change of the data will
be followed by the change of the hash value. The data to be encoded is often called the
“message”, and the hash value is sometimes called the message digest or digest [43, 47].
Hash functions should have 3 significant properties:
• Problem 1. Given a hash function h : X → Y and an element y ∈ Y . Find x ∈ X
such that h(x) = y.
It is infeasible to find an original message on the given message digest (one-way
function or preimage resistance).
5
The complexity of the brute force attack for finding the solution for this problem is
2n ∗ f(n), where n is the length of the hash and f(n) is the complexity of the hash
function.
• Problem 2. Given a hash function h : X → Y and an element x ∈ X . Find x′ ∈ X
such that x′ 6= x and h(x′) = h(x).
It is infeasible to find a message different from the given message, so that their hashes
will be the same (second preimage resistance).
For this problem the complexity of the exhaustive search is the same as for preimage-
resistance.
• Problem 3. Given a hash function h : X → Y . Find x, x′ ∈ X such that x′ 6= x and
h(x′) = h(x).
It is infeasible to find two different messages that hash to the same hash value (colli-
sion resistance).
Due to the birthday paradox the lower bound for the complexity of the attacks on this
property is significantly improved and estimated as square root of the time needed
for the full brute force.
To guarantee the security of a hash function, designers should control all three aspects
mentioned. Why these properties are important? As we will discuss further the applications
of hash functions, we will see that they are broadly used in many computer programs
to provide security. Thus, we want to avoid such undesirable properties, as for example
encoding of different messages to the same value, i.e. collisions. The vivid example of
how one can cheat, using the hash functions’ collisions, is the experiment done by the
group of researches with the prediction about the elections of the US President in 2008.
They made secret a prediction about the winner, published the hash value of the document,
and claimed that their prediction would be correct. The trick was that the researchers were
able to produce a set of documents with names of all the candidates, that would hash to the
same value, which was announced. Thus, we see that the used hash function, namely MD5,
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was not collision-resistant. This fact clearly showed the danger of further usage of MD5.
At the same time the function should be fast to compute and should use little memory,
so it can successfully operate in streaming mode. Besides the main properties, a hash
function should be resistant to other popular attacks like zero-preimage, length extension,
etc. It is difficult to build up an ideal hash function, meaning resistant in terms of collisions,
preimages and second-preimages. With the current computational power, “problems which
are infeasible” require more than 280 computational effort, which may remain valid for a
number of years. Nevertheless, the scientific progress in the technical area is enormous and
new ideas such as quantum computers and their incredible computational abilities are very
promising, however this is only a research topic at present.
2.2 Merkle-Damgård construction
Let us observe a couple of important design patterns. One of the most widely used
architectures of the cryptographic hash functions is Merkle-Damgård construction [43]. As
we follow the definition, the hash function should process the input of arbitrary length and
produce the output of the fixed size. To implement this mechanism the authors suggested an
idea of breaking the input up into a series of equal-sized blocks, and then applying on them
the specific compression function, that would be able to deliver the output of the correct
size. The compression function is the heart of the hash function, specifically designed in
every case.
Now we will take a look on the specifics of the construction itself (Figure 1). First, the
message is padded and divided into n blocks, the compression function f takes the input
anf the value of the initialization vector (IV). The IV is usually a constant, defined by the
designers of the algorithm. Then the compression function processes the input and pro-
duces the output of the same size as one of the inputs, that is an intermediate result, which
is taken with the next input message block on the next step. After this iterative structure is
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processed, to strengthen the construction the last output goes through the finalization.
Figure 1. Merkle-Damgård construction scheme ([47]).
On the basis of Merkle-Damgård construction designers distinguish 2 different approaches:
narrow- and wide-pipe. In the wide-pipe construction the second chaining value is added,
thus the internal state becomes larger. In this case the length of the hash function output
will be twice bigger than the length of the message block and twice bigger that the length
of the chaining variable. The idea was first proposed by Stefan Lucks. On Figure 2 you can
see the illustration of the idea.
On top of that Mridul Nandi and Souradyuti Paul presented the fast wide-pipe (Figure
3). They managed to make the computation faster by combining the second chaining value
with the output of the compression function. In the case of narrow-pipe design the length
of the output of the hash function will be the same as the length of the chaining input,
but will be twice larger than the length of the message block. Both designs are used in
various hash functions, for example, in the SHA-3 competition such functions as JH, Echo,
BMW present the wide-pipe construction, while Hamsi, Shavite3, Skein refer to narrow-
pipe design.
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Figure 2. Wide-pipe design ([47]).
Figure 3. Fast wide-pipe design ([47]).
One of the most famous representatives of Merkle-Damgård construction is MD5, which
is the basis for SHA-1. Among the reasons of the popularity of this construction is the
proven fact that if the compression function f is collision resistant, then so is the hash
function, which uses it [47]. Unfortunately, this construction also has several undesirable
vulnerabilities against the following attacks:
• Length extension attacks – given h(m) and len(m), but notm, by choosing a suitable
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m′, an attacker can calculate h(m‖m′), where ‖ denotes concatenation. Once an
attacker has one collision, he can find more very easily.
• Second preimage attacks – given a fixed message m1, find a different message m2,
such that h(m2) = h(m1). This type of attack against long messages are always
much more efficient than brute force.
• Multi-collisions attacks – given a hash function h() and a set of messages
{m1, ...,mr}, multi-collision or r-multi-collision on a function is a property, such
that h(m1) = h(m2) = ... = h(mr). In other words many messages have the same
hash value. Antoine Joux was investigating this question a lot and his results show
that it is not much harder to build a collision on 2t messages, than on 2 inputs [20].
2.3 Sponge construction
Sponge construction is a novel type of construction, which is used in the design of hash
functions. For example, it is the basic idea in the design of Keccak. Let us look at the main
features of this approach.
The designers describe 2 main phases of the algorithm: the absorbing phase, which
takes the input and calls the compression functions, and the squeezing phase, that delivers
the output (Figure 4). The sponge construction works in the iterative manner, depending
on how many rounds eventually has the hash function. Several principal attributes should
be defined to understand this approach:
• We assume that the compression function f is operating on the fixed number of bits
b, that parameter is called the width. The width b consists of 2 parts: bitrate r and
capacity c, b = r + c. We call these b bits of the construction the state. Basically,
the compression functions takes the bits of the input message and the bits of the state
and performs all kinds of permutations and transformations on them.
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• The bitrate r is the number of bits, which represent the part of state that is mixed with
the same number of bits from the input. The input message is processed in blocks of
the size r, and even before the absorbing phase it is padded. Padding rule depends
on the particular hash function and usually the size of the output of the hash. After
the absorbing phase the first r bits of the state with the function f applied to them
are returned as the output to the user.
• The parameter c corresponds to the part of the state, which is never interleaved with
the input values, but is is processed with the compression function as well. This
attribute is supposed to increase the security level of the construction.
Figure 4. Sponge construction scheme ([10]).
One of the most important criteria of the successful hash function is the level of security.
Thus, the designers of different functions and constructions work thoughtfully on the main
properties of the hash functions in order to provide high level of preimage, second-preimage
and collision resistance. We usually describe the complexity of breaking the function (in
terms of breaking one of the 3 properties, listed above) as the number of operations that
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are needed to perform the attack. The authors of the sponge construction, claim that the
security of this algorithm depends on the capacity and bitrate. These are 2 parameters that
vary from the size of output, thus for the particular hash function, based on the sponge
construction, we can have different sizes of the output value.Thus, the security claims of
the sponge construction with the certain capacity c describe the following cases [10]:
• Collision resistance: if the output length is nc, the collision resistance level is 2n/2.
If the output length is nc, the resistance level is 2c/2.
• (Second) preimage resistance: If the output length is nc/2,, the (second) preimage
resistance level is 2n. If the output length is nc/2, the resistance level is 2c/2.
2.4 Applications
We are using hash functions extensively in our daily work, often without even noticing.
Everyone who is working with a computer bumps into hashing in some way. Especially,
when you are in the cryptography or programming field. We will describe several applica-
tions of hash functions in the modern world.
Today, E-mail and electronic documents are an essential part of our lives. For a long time
now the electronic signature has been the method used for document verification, having the
same power as a handwritten signature. This concept is implemented via a digital signature.
Historically, digital signatures were the first application of cryptographically secure hash
functions. Hash functions have a dual role in practical signature schemes: they expand
the domain of messages that can be signed by a scheme and they are an essential element
of the scheme’s security. We have several goals in this case: to prevent any unexpected
changes in the content of the message, to be able to prove that message comes from the
right person, etc. Thus the most convenient mechanism will be the one, which transforms
any signature scheme good for signing messages of a fixed length, and a collision-resistant
hash function into a signature scheme, can handle arbitrary-length messages. This ideas
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are implemented in so called the hash-and-sign paradigm, that is the basis for all modern
practical signature schemes [26]. A vivid example of this concept is how the SHA-1 is a
part of Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital signature Algorithm
(ECDSA). In this case hash functions provide us with fast and secure method to keep our
documents and mail safe.
Another highly widespread application of hash functions is message-authentication code
(MAC). MAC is a keyed hash function, satisfying certain cryptographic properties, which
may be used to verify the integrity and authenticity of information [26]. We describe an
example in terms of a typical situation for cryptography - conversation between Alice and
Bob. Assume that they want to keep privacy of their correspondence. They share a secret
key k. Whenever Alice sends a message m to Bob, she appends an authentication tag
v = h(k,m). Bob checks the received value by comparing it to the hash value of the
message, that he calculates himself. The goal is to prevent the adversary from forging
a message-tag pair, that would be accepted by Bob, and fool him into believing that the
message was from Alice. As we know properties of the hash functions, we can easily
conclude that implementation of this scheme will be perfect through hashing. Collision
resistance gives us safety in the sense of getting the original message unchanged, while the
high speed of calculating a hash value allows us to easily compute the authentication value.
More than a quarter of the world population uses the Internet - search engines, com-
mercial web-sites, social networks, etc. People have multiple e-mail accounts, profiles in
different systems, accounts in various web-stores, and everywhere client authentication is
required. The client needs to present a password previously registered with the server.
Storing passwords of all users on the server poses an obvious security risk. Fortunately, the
server does not need to know the passwords it may store their hashes (together with some
salt to frustrate dictionary attacks) and use the information to match it with the hashes of
alleged passwords [29]. It is easy to verify a correct hash provided by a client (fast com-
putation of hash value), but it is very difficult for the adversary to reconstruct the original
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password from the hash, as the hash functions are one-way functions.
For programmers the most wide-used application of the hash functions is a hash table,
which is a data structure that supports efficient store and look-up operations. Also hash
algorithms are used as web certificates, pseudo-random number generators, cryptographic
protocols as SSL, SSH and many other applications.
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Chapter 3
Secure Hash Algorithm history
3.1 Overview of SHA-family
As hash functions are utilized in a variety of applications, the idea of having a standard
in hashing becomes apparent. In the beginning of 1990’s the decision was made to design
a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), which was supposed to become a federal standard. Cur-
rently, the cryptographic community is in the process of the selection of the forth function
which will be good for several decades in future (the ancestors of SHA-3 function were
SHA-0, SHA-1 and SHA-2). However, with the rapid growing of computational abilities
of modern machines some of these functions were declared as insecure. To understand the
new developments in this area, let us examine these functions more carefully.
SHA-0 was issued in 1993 by NIST. It was very soon replaced by slightly improved
version called SHA-1. The base of both functions was MD-5 by Ron Rivest from MIT.
The difference between these 2 versions was the additional rotational operation [47]. In
1997 the attack on SHA-0 was found which provided a collision with some probability,
producing further changes in standards. In 1998 two French researchers, Florent Chabaud
and Antoine Joux, presented an attack on SHA-0, where collisions can be found with com-
plexity 261, they needed only 261 messages instead of 280 to obtain the collision. They were
experimenting with different versions of the function, varying the number of rounds. Their
result was improved and in 2004 the attack on the full version of SHA-0 gave a collision.
The complexity of this computation was about 251 which is quite feasible now. The latest
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results by Wang in 2005 allow to get collision in 239 hash operations, which undermines
the NIST security standards. In fact this attack by Wang declared MD5 and SHA-0 as
completely insecure.
SHA-1 is one of the current hash standards and it is still one of the most widespread
hash functions. As we know, one of the most popular applications of the hash functions
is authorization certificates, plenty of them are using SHA-1 now. Unfortunately, after
attacks in 2005 NIST decided that the modern world need new hash standard with the
higher security level [31]. Specifically on SHA-1 the researches were able to attack the
reduced version of the function (53 rounds instead of 80) with less than 280 messages, later
the successful attack was performed on the full version of SHA-1 with complexity 269. All
this activity has seriously compromised SHA-1.
Soon after such results, the community decided on switching to the SHA-2 for security
issues. However, even to this day people are using some protocols based on MD5, which is
actually broken. NIST has declared that after 2010 SHA-1 can be used only in hash-based
message authentication codes (HMACs), key derivation functions (KDFs), and random
number generators (RNGs). Basically, nowadays NIST strongly recommends to use SHA-
2 family as the security standard for various applications and protocols [31].
SHA-2 was set up as a new standard in 2001. There is the whole family of functions
SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 with different sizes of the digest. The name of
the algorithm which is now called SHA-2 is Advanced Encryption Standard. The design
of both SHA-1 and SHA-2 (and also MD5) uses Merkle-Damgård construction. SHA-2
provides better security guarantee than SHA-1, but although it is already a standard for a
decade, SHA-1 is still very widely used. Now vendors are not quite sure if they need to start
working with SHA-2 or wait for the new standard, which is SHA-3, because nevertheless
despite all the attacks, there are no collisions found on SHA-1. The best known attacks
on SHA-2 nowadays are performed only on the reduced versions of the function: 41 of
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the 64 rounds of SHA-256 or 46 of the 80 rounds of SHA-512. Vivid examples of SHA-2
usage will be SHA-256 in the authentication process of Debian Linux sotware packages,
SHA-256 and SHA-512 in Unix and Linux secure password hashing [47].
Although the complexity of breaking SHA-2 is still considered infeasible, NIST has de-
cided to start working on the next hash standard, which is basically SHA-3 competition.
And the following table presents the comparison of all SHA functions and their character-
istics up to this point. Analysing the table, we can see the progress in the development of
the hash functions: the latest standard offers the whole variety of versions with different
sizes of output blocks, which makes the function more tunable for applications.
Table 1. SHA functions ([47]).
Algorithm Output size Internal state size Block size Collisions
SHA-0 160 160 512 Yes
SHA-1 160 160 512 Yes
SHA-2 (SHA-256/224) 256/224 256 512 None
SHA-2 (SHA-512/384) 512/384 512 1024 None
The following diagram illustrates the progress in the collision attacks within approxi-
mately last 20 years.
Figure 5. Complexity of collision attacks ([39]).
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The complexities are compared with the standard brute force requirements. As we can
observe, the MD family is completely broken nowadays, but SHA-1 still holds the position.
If we look precisely at the diagram, we see that SHA-1 is characterized now by the com-
plexities of 260, which is still hard to compute. Thus it can be used in some applications of
cryptographic hash functions, although it is not completely secure now.
3.2 The NIST competition
3.2.1 Background
The competition was launched in 2007. According to the format of the competition,
there are several rounds in it. The winner should be chosen in 2012. The submission re-
quirements included such aspects as: free worldwide, implementable on varied hardware
and software platforms, must support 224, 256, 384, and 512 bit digests, and messages of
at least up to 264 bits. The configuration of the submission package included information
concerning possible attack scenarios, source code in ANSI C, time and space requirements
for hardware and software for 8-, 32- and 64-bit platforms, issued or pending patents, doc-
umentation, and self-evaluation. The decision about candidates for each round is based
on the work of the committee and the analysis of the public comments. There is a great
amount of work going on around this challenge in the cryptographic world, therefore can-
didate functions are analysed from different points of view by various researches.
Initially 64 candidate functions were submitted to the committee; the first round in 2008
was dealing with 51 candidates. The next step was the round of public comments and in
2009, 14 participants were approved for the second round. The competition caused a great
interest in the cryptographic community, plenty of work is done by individual researches,
which helps NIST a lot. A public forum (hash-forum@nist.gov) became quite popular and
after a while was declared an official resource, that is used in the evaluation process. As the
area is very dynamic and new, there are a lot of comments, notes and essays in the Internet,
showing cryptanalysis and performance studies of the candidate functions, but not all of
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them can be already found as published papers, although some of them are presented in
various conferences [32]. The complete timeline of the event up to the current moment is
presented in Table 2 [32]:
Table 2. The official timeline of the SHA-3 competition ([32]).
October 31 - Cryptographic Hash Workshop, NIST,
November 1, 2005 Gaithersburg, MD.
August 24-25, 2006 Second Cryptographic Hash Workshop, UCSB, CA.
January 23, 2007 Federal Register Notice - Announcing the Development
of New Hash Algorithm(s) for the Revision of Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 180-2,
Secure Hash Standard.
November 2, 2007 Federal Register Notice - Announcing a Request for
Candidate Algorithm Nominations for a New
Cryptographic Hash Algorithm (SHA-3) Family.
SHA-3 competition began.
October 31, 2008 SHA-3 Submission Deadline.
December 10, 2008 First-round candidates announced. The first round began.
February 25-28, 2009 First SHA-3 Candidate Conference, K.U. Leuven, Belgium.
July 24, 2009 Second-round candidates announced. End of the first round.
September 28, 2009 Second-round candidates posted for public review.
The second round began.
August 23-24, 2010 Second SHA-3 Candidate Conference, UCSB, CA.
December 9, 2010 SHA-3 finalists announced. End of the second round.
One of the significant resources that collects information about the competition and its
participants is a web-portal SHA-3 Zoo [14], which is hosted by the Graz University of
Technology. This web-resource provides lots of materials on the candidate-functions, in-
cluding original submissions, current publications about the attacks, papers and opinions.
An interesting point is that NIST does not provide anything of the kind. Another huge re-
source is eBash by Daniel Bernstein from the University of Illinois in Chicago,IL [13],
which is part of large system benchmarking cryptographic functions. There is a great
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amount of data on performance of the SHA-3 candidate functions on various types of plat-
forms [40]. The following table represents the candidate-functions of the second round.
Table 3. The candidate-functions of the second round ([32]).
Hash Name Principal submitter
BLAKE Jean-Philippe Aumasson
Blue Midnight Wish Svein Johan Knapskog
CubeHash Daniel J. Bernstein
ECHO Henri Gilbert
Fugue Charanjit S. Jutla
Grøstl Lars R. Knudsen
Hamsi Özgül Küçük
JH Hongjun Wu






Although, this set of the functions presents variety of different designs, some of them
share the same base constructions. As we can see, there are lots of functions, which are
following the popular Merkle-Damgård construction and new sponge design. Table 4 ([21])
by NIST official representative John Kelsey collects the information about the nature of new
hash functions.
Table 4. Design diversity ([21]).
Narrow-Pipe MD Wide-Pipe MD
Bitsliced Hamsi JH
AES Shavite3 Echo Grøstl







Taking into consideration all current work and research in the cryptographic society,
practically all the participants have made some tweaks or adjustments to their original
submissions. Here are some of the examples of the latest changes:
• BMW: changed inputs to f0 and f1; additional invocation of compression function at
the final step.
• CubeHash: double the number of rounds (r=16); increased the size of message block
(b=32).
• Hamsi: additional variants specified.
• Keccak: increased message block size (rate); increased number of rounds (from 18
to 24).
• Luffa: modification of S-box; changed order of SubCrumb input; always one round
in output transformation.
• SHAvite-3: Inversion of some counter values.
• SIMD: changed rotational constants and permutations for diffusions between parallel
Feistels.
• Skein: changed rotational constants.
In fact none of the second-round functions were completely broken. NIST mostly re-
ceived “partial attacks” - attacks on the reduced, weakened versions of the functions [32].
Eventually, the finalists were announced on December 9, 2010, 3 of the functions are de-







In the official comments on the final round NIST states that the committee’s primary
concerns are taking care of security issues, design and performance of the functions. One
of the ideas was to eliminate the functions with similar repeating patterns in the base con-
struction. The authors were allowed to add some tweaks to the functions by January,6 2011.
Almost all of them had minor changes shown here:
• BLAKE: final version had an increased number of rounds.
• Grøstl: shift values in one of the permutation were changed; “bigger” round constants
are used.
• JH: number of rounds increased.
• Keccak: the padding rule was simplified; the diversifier parameter was removed; the
restriction on the bitrate was removed.
Next year, the public comments shall be accepted, and according to the timeline, in 2012
the winner of the competition shall be announced. In fact, NIST will keep analysing the
chosen algorithm for 3 more years following the end of the competition. The main goal
of such detailed analysis is to obtain the hash standard that will remain secure for at least
twenty years after its selection.
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3.2.2 Evaluation Criteria
In January, 2007, NIST published a list of the criteria, which candidate-functions should
fulfil Draft Minimum Requirements, Submission Requirements, and Evaluation Criteria for
candidate hash algorithms, all available for public comment in a Federal Register Notice
[32, 33]. These requirements and evaluation criteria were updated, based on public feed-
back, and included in a later, second Federal Register Notice, published on November 2,
2007 [32, 34]. The three main aspects are the security, cost and performance, and algorithm
and implementation characteristics.
The main criteria determine if the candidate function will proceed to the next round, but
there are several additional issues that are important and can help to decide which of the
similar candidates should proceed. One of this additional parameters is the ability to suit
equally well to different applications. For example, message authentication codes, pseudo-
random number generators, key derivation and one-way functions for obfuscating password
files - they all have different requirements, but the hash standard will be used as a part in all
of them [41]. Another idea was to make the designers of the functions test the models they
invented against particular types of attacks. Here is the list of major security-evaluation
factors[32]:
• applications;
• specific requirements for HMAC, Pseudo Random Functions or Randomized Hash-
ing;
• additional security requirements;
• attack resistance.
The second important criteria is cost and performance. NIST has announced the recom-
mended memory consumption and time complexity for the functions. The main goal is to
provide better performance of SHA-3 comparing to SHA-2, also taking into consideration
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increased security demands. The question of cost is related to the actual implementation
in hardware, although the function should provide efficient results in speed as well. In the
second evaluation criteria, NIST includes the following points [32]:
• computational efficiency in terms of the speed of the algorithm;
• memory requirements, such as the code size and the random-access memory (RAM)
requirements for software implementations and the gate-counts for hardware imple-
mentations.
Concerning the third criteria, the algorithm should be flexible and simple enough, which
increases its’chances to be selected to the next round. Numerous new designs were offered,
quite different from SHA-2, and the preference was given to the candidates, which can run
equally well on different platforms. This reduces cost, and capability of running in parallel
increases the performance.
For the functions that have advanced to the second round, additional tweaks to the al-
gorithms were allowed. The reasoning was different. For some functions, adding tunable
parameters would help to increase the performance according to the platform and, to oth-
ers, it was a chance to get rid of some small issues that seemed to be potentially dangerous





Keccak is a family of cryptographic sponge functions created by the team of Guido
Bertoni, Joan Daemen, Michaël Peeters and Gilles Van Assche [11]. The functions differ
by the length of permutation. There are 7 Keccak-f permutations, denoted as Keccak-f [b],
where b = 25 × 2l and l ranges from 0 to 6. Kecccak-f [b] is a permutation over Zb2,
where the bits are numbered from 0 to b–1. As we know from the definition of sponge
construction, b is the width of the permutation. The version with l = 6 and b = 1600 is one
recommended as the main SHA-3 contestant.
The state, which is the main element of the sponge construction, in Keccak is a hypercube
a. Basically, we can describe is as a three-dimensional array a[5][5][w], with w = 2l, over
GF (2). By a[x][y][z], where x, y ∈ Z5 and z ∈ Zw, we describe the individual bit in
position (x, y, z), as coordinates in the hypercube a. If we make a projection of three-
dimensional state a to the definition of state in basic sponge construction, we will obtain
the following mapping s[w(5y + x) + z] = a[x][y][z]. The initial value of the state is the
zero-state. The design of the hash function strictly restricts any usage of the initial state
as the input, because it can destroy the initial approach. Keccak has a round structure, and
each round consists of five functions. Some of them operate on the whole hypercube, but
some of them just on parts of it, like slices, rows, columns. Here is the precise description
of each round R:
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R = ι ◦ χ ◦ π ◦ ρ ◦ θ.














 in GF(5)2×2 or t = −1 and x = y = 0;









χ : a[x]← a[x] + (a[x+ 1] + 1)a[x+ 2],
ι : a← a+RC[ir].
All the operations are considered in terms of GF (2). Round constants RC[ir] are prede-
fined and differ from round to round. The number of rounds nr also varies from the version
of the permutation used and is defined by the following formula nr = 12 + 2l [11].
The heart of the Keccak design is the sponge construction. We denote here the com-
pression function as f , as we know for Keccak f consists of 5 separate functions, m is an
input message, standart notation from sponge construction principals bitrate parameter r,
capacity c, width b, and padding rule pad(r). The initial state value 0b is also called the
root state. The is a specific restriction, which prohibits to use the value of the root state as
input.
1. Generally, we have the sponge function Z = sponge(m, l), where m ∈ Z∗2 , l > 0
and Z ∈ Z l2
2. Pad the message m and divide it into blocks of size r, P = m||pad(r), each block is
denoted by Pi.
3. Define the root state, s = 0b.
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4. For all the input blocks perform compression and interleave with the state - absorbing
phase:
for i = 0to|P |r − 1{
s = s⊕ (|P |i||0b−r)
s = f(s)
}
5. Obtain the output bits Z - squeezing phase: Z = bscr




The original version of the function was tweaked after the series of papers about the
zero-sum distinguishers by Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Willi Meier and others [4, 8, 12]. In
particular, the number of rounds was increased. After the function succeeded to the third
round some small corrections were made, you can see the changes in section 3.2. So now,
we have the third version of the original submission. The official NIST report says that
Keccak was selected as the finalist, mainly, due to the high security level, the simplicity of
the design and effective performance[32].
4.2 Performance
One of the important criteria for SHA-3 candidate functions is performance. Still there
is no particular standard defined by NIST of how exactly the performance should be mea-
sured. Thus, different researches offer various solutions and try as many platforms as pos-
sible. One of the successful openings was the System for Unified Performance Evaluation
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Related to Cryptographic Operations and Primitives (SUPERCOP) software, developed by
the VAMPIRE group with Daniel Bernstein (see appendix B for details). On Figure 6 you
can see the diagram, which shows the price-performance ratio of 14 hash functions from
the second round of the SHA-3 competition.
Figure 6. Price-performance ratio diagram by D. Bernstein ([5])
This figure shows the comparison of the candidates functions in terms of FPGA plat-
forms. FPGA stands for Field-Programmable Gate Array, kind of programmable curciut,
which is widely used nowadays. The vertical axes here is the price-performance ratio,
which characterizes the candidates, the lower is the ratio the better it is. The horizontal
axes represent FPGA slices, the parts of the curcuit, where agian the smaller the value, the
better it is. The diagram shows several result groups: Keccak and CubeHash are best (and
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better than SHA-512), with Keccak slightly ahead; JH and Luffa are next; Grøstl is next,
only about a factor of 2 behind Keccak and CubeHash; Shabal, Skein, and BLAKE are
behind Grøstl; etc. [5]
The easiest way is to measure the performance on the desktop computer, but as there
are multiple applications of hash functions, we also need to know the results of perfor-
mance on FPGA’s and so on. Some researches present testing on absolutely non-common
platforms such as the Cell Broadband Engine (Cell) and the NVIDIA Graphics Processing
Units (GPUs) [7]. In particular in that paper all round 2 functions were tested and Keccak
performance was somewhere in the middle among all the non-AES structure candidates,
as they were measured separately. Another team was testing 7 functions from the second
round on the embedded systems, particularly on smart cards. Thus, Blue Midnight Wish
and Shabal are always on top of the rankings, followed by BLAKE, Luffa and Skein. Fi-
nally, Grøstl and Keccak are behind. They also studied the tolerance to the passage from
32-bit to 8-bit of each candidates. Overall in these seria of experiments BMW was defined
as a leader, followed by Luffa, Keccak and BLAKE, Skein, Shabal, and Grøstl [19]. Some
results of the performance on different platforms were collected by John Kelsey for NIST
report, we present them in table 5 [21].
In this table we can see 3 types of platforms: ordinary desktop, application-specific
integrated circuit (ASIC) and FPGA. They were selected to show the candidates from the
different point of views. It is impossible to say which one is the most important, but they
all are highly needed in various areas. Thus for ordinary users, who are working with
web-sites, for example, every day and thus deal with secure network protocols, the fast
performance in software is important (desktop performance). ASICs are integrated circuits
designed for very specific needs, thus they represent the significant element of hardware.
Thus for the engineers, who design chips and care about their security, it is important to
have fast implementation of the hash function in hardware. Programmable circuits –FPGAs
are widely used nowadays for numerous applications, even for code breaking, they can
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perform massive parallelization, which increases the speed of brute force attack. In order
to try these attacks we also need high speed of computation of the hash function itself on
FPGAs.
Table 5. Performance of SHA-3 candidates on different platforms ([21]).
NN Desktop ASIC throughput FPGA(ratio)
1 BMW Luffa Keccak
2 Shabal Keccak CubeHash
3 Skein CubeHash Luffa
4 SIMD Hamsi JH
5 Luffa Blake Grøstl
6 Keccak Grøstl Shabal
7 Blake SHAvite3 Blake
8 JH JH Skein
9 CubeHash BMW SHAvite3
10 Grøstl Shabal Fugue
11 Hamsi Skein Hamsi
12 SHAvite3 Echo BMW
13 Echo Fugue Echo
14 Fugue SIMD SIMD
From the ranking showed in this table we can conclude that Keccak is overall in the
leading group performance-wise. According to the NIST report, Keccak is an average per-
former in software on most of the platforms specifically for long messages [32]. Although,
it is among the top performers in throughput-to-area ratio, which is the hardware parameter.
As we can conclude from this table, Keccak performs relatively well on both hardware and
software, which gives the function good position in the whole competition. At the same
time BMW shows not so stable results.
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4.3 Related work
As we have mentioned earlier, most of the analysis on the SHA-3 candidates comes
from public comments and research of various cryptography specialists and gurus all over
the world. Thus, we have information about very different aspects of the cryptanalysis of
the selected function. Nevertheless, none of the attacks performed on Keccak dispute the
security guarantees provided by the designers of the hash function.
Let us focus on attacks known as the reduced versions of the function. One of the at-
tacks made by Paweł Morawiecki and Marian Srebrny was implemented with the usage of
SAT solver, which is described in their paper [28]. This was a preimage attack only on the
3-round version of Keccak, while the full version contains 24 rounds. Jean-Philippe Au-
masson and Dmitry Khovratovich were trying to apply different cube-testers, but analysis
of the reduced versions of the function made them think that the full version has quite an
adequate number of rounds, which allows to support the initial security claims. These ex-
periments are described fully in the paper [3]. Joel Lathrop was investigating the influence
of cube attacks on Keccak [23]. Still, according to his results, cube attacks are successful
only for very special cases.
Jean-Philippe Aumasson and Willi Meier presented the so called zero-sum distinguisher
in their paper [4], but it doesn’t really reflect the security claim of Keccak, as they mention.
Authors state that this research is more about investigating how many rounds are needed
for Keccak than about disturbing any security claims. Nevertheless, after this paper, the
Keccak team decided to increase the number of rounds for Keccak from 18 to 24 in the
second round. In [4] we can see deterministic distinguishers for the reduced version of the
function with 9 rounds and the authors were also able to get shortcut distinguishers for up
to 16 rounds function. After this paper several researches were trying to go deeper into this
topic and some of them were rather successful. Thus, Christina Boura and Anne Canteaut
in [8] were able to extend the idea of Aumasson and Meier up to 18 rounds of Keccak,
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which makes us think that the full version of the function is also not ideal.
The idea of Aumasson and Meier inspired us to continue the research in this direction,
thus in this work we are investigating the algorithm for building zero-sum distinguishers.
Later in Chapter 6 we give full description of the algorithm and present some new tools
for obtaining the solution of the problem. For better understanding of the algorithm, we
provide the series of experiments for the hash functions of different size and structure and
various dimensions, which finally leads to the tests on the full-size hash functions (see





Blue Midnight Wish (BMW) was designed by Danilo Gligoroski and Vlastimil Klima;
the whole team includes also Svein Johan Knapskog, Mohamed El-Hadedy, Jørn Amund-
sen, Stig Frode Mjølsnes [18, 19]. Gligoroski and Klima were more focused on investigat-
ing and improving Turbo SHA-2 hash function, which became the predecessor of BMW.
BMW is a family of hash functions, which provides the algorithm for getting the output
size of 224, 256, 384 and 512 bits. The function is based on the block cipher approach, the
core of the design is wide-pipe Merkle-Damgård construction. The computation runs in 16
rounds, there is an additional parameter P in one of the compression functions, f1, which
defines the number of complex rounds. Consequently, the number of simple rounds is 16
P , default value is P = 14.
The general scheme of the algorithm consists the following steps [45]:
1. Preprocessing
• padding a message,
• dividing the resulting input into blocks of m –bits,
• setting the initial values.
2. Hash computation
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• generating a message schedule from the padded message,
• generating a series of double pipe values,
• the final double pipe value is used as an input value for a finalization function,
• the n Least Significant Bits (LSB) of the finalization function are used to define
the hash value.
The compression function of BMW consists of 3 functions f0, f1, f2. Here is the descrip-
tion of the algorithm provided by the authors, where all the inputs taken by the functions
are presented.
Algorithm 1. A generic description of the Blue Midnight Wish hash algorithm ([19])
Input: Message M of length l bits, and the message digest size n.
Output: A message digest Hash, that is n bits long.
1. Preprocessing
• Pad the message M
• Parse the padded message intoN ,m-bit message blocks,M (1),M (2), ... ,M (N).
• Set the initial value of double pipe H(0)
2. Hash computation
For i=1 to N
Q
(i)




i, H i−1, Q
(i)
a );












N , CONST (final), Q
(final)
a );






4. Hash = Take− n− Least− Significant−Bits(H(final)).
The functions used in the compression function involve a variety of shifts, rotation and
XOR operations. There is also a set of predefined constants for the function. All logical
functions and constants, that are used in the model of the hash function, can be found in the
appendix A. The general scheme of how the compression function operates within BMW,
is presented in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Graphical representation of the compression function in BMW ([19]).
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Concerning the security questions, the complexity claimed by the designers gives the
following statistics:
1. Collision resistance of approximately n/2 bits,
2. Preimage resistance of approximately n bits,
3. Second-preimage resistance of approximately nk bits for any message shorter than
2k bits,
4. Resistance to length-extension attacks,
5. Resistance to multicollision attacks
Thus, even the smallest complexity for BMW224 for finding collisions yields 2112. The
other numbers can be easily computed respectively to the size n of the output of the BMW
hash function. We are familiar with the definitions of first three types of vulnerabilities.
Let us define the other ones. Length-extension attacks suppose the ability to find message
m′, if the hash of message m h(m) and the length of m len(m) are given. One of the initial
NIST requirements make the designers to define specifically resistance against this type of
attack. Multicollision attack is similar to the regular collision, but the only difference is
that in multicollision case several message should collide.
The original version of BMW was optimized to prevent the possibility of the attacks
described by Soren S.Thomsen [45]. There was a significant tweak, that affected functions
f0 and f1 and also the finalization round was added. However, the improvements did not
stop the attacks, so the security claims were not sufficient enough for the committee. Also,
because of the irregularity of the design, which was not understood well enough, Blue
Midnight Wish did not proceed to the final round.
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5.2 Performance
Comparing to the other participants of the second round of the SHA-3 competition,
BMW is a strong performer. It is among the top-performers across most platforms for
long and very short messages, according to the official NIST report [32]. Blue Midnight
Wish keeps strong positions in speed and average ROM usage as well, although it requires
significant amount of RAM, because of its large state size. It is not so good in hardware,
but has good potentials for speeding up, which, unfortunately, increases the expenses. The
difference in the performance on the software and hardware can be observed in Table 5,
which places BMW first for desktop tests and the hardware test results are in the second
half of the table.
While talking about the exotic platforms, in [20] the tests on smart cards showed BMW
as a leader among other 7 tested functions. In [1] different hardware implementations of
BMW were observed. The researchers consider that although BMW does not have the
round-like structure, which seems to be a disadvantage in space saving and hardware costs,
it is good enough in terms of pipelining. The authors of the function claim BMW to be the
fastest hash function among the Second Round SHA-3 candidates.
Overall, NIST characterises BMW as a very good performer with modest memory re-
quirements, which is suitable for a wide range of platforms.
5.3 Related work
The version of BMW which is now in the second round of the NIST competition is a
tweaked version. The original one was optimized to prevent the possibility of the attacks
described by Soren S. Thomsen. In his paper [44], he showed scenarios for the attacks
on the compression function used in BMW. Despite this, the complexities of these attacks
applied to the length of output of the hash function are still giving infeasible time ranging
from 281 up to 2384 for different versions of BMW. All of this made the authors submit
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the improved version of the design of the hash function for the second round. Thomsen
describes the algorithm how to provide the following attack with the corresponding com-
plexities (where n is the length of the input)[44]:
1. Near-collision attack, 214
2. Pseudo-collision attack 2(3n/8+1)
3. Pseudo (second) preimage attack, 2(3n/4+1)
Near-collision attack aims to find a pair of messages with hash values differing in only
few bits. Even if they are found that fact does not seriously affect the security claims of
the hash function, because the full collision could never be found. The similar case are the
pseudo-attacks, which are the attacks on the compression function, but not on the whole
function. That is an interesting question how really the small vulnerabilities in the com-
pression can affect the whole hash, because the complete mechanism of the hash function
is usually much more than just use of compression function.
After the tweaked version was presented, the possible attacks are still being developed.
J. P. Aumasson presented a practical distinguisher for the compression function of BMW.
[30] presents rotational analysis of the hash function and the authors managed to find some
weaknesses in compression function of BMW. Another severe attack was presented by
Leurent [24]. His attack produced a collision on the first 96 bits of the chaining value with
complexity 232. Their work with Thomsen [25] have extended the attack to 300 of the 512
bits of the chaining value at a similar cost [32].
Nevertheless, the designers of BMW stress the point that BMW is the only hash function
in the competition that has only pseudo attacks, thus the security claims still hold. All the
authors of the attacks also say that there was not any attack, which affected the security
of the function. Table 6 summarizes the significant attacks on Blue Midnight Wish [35].
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And as we can see from the table, the number of rounds attacked in one of the compression
functions is very small.
Table 6. Significant attack on Blue Midnight Wish ([35]).
Attacker Hash size Type of attack Compression function
Attacked variables (rounds) Compl.
Aumasson All pseudo-distinguisher 1 out of 16 219
Nikolic et.al. 512 pseudo-distinguisher 1 out of 16 2278.2
(modified function)
Guo and All pseudo-distinguisher 1 out of 16 21
Thomsen
Leurent 256 pseudo-collision 3 out of 16 232
Leurentand 256 pseudo-collision 3 full, 7 partial out of 16 232
Thomsen




Zero-sum attacks with SAT solvers
6.1 The zero-sum property
6.1.1 Definition
The notation of zero-sum distinguisher has been introduced by J.-P. Aumasson and W.
Meier in [4]. For a function f : n→ m a zero-sum is a set of inputs z1, ..., zk, summing to
zero in terms of exclusive-or, such that their hashes f(zi) will also sum to zero, i.e.,
⊕ki=1zi = ⊕ki=1f(zi) = 0.
As it is considered, there are not many zero-sums for a randomly chosen function, thus
several sets of inputs with such a property can be seen as a distinguishing feature of f
[8]. How this can be related to the security of hash function? As the zero-sum property is
based on the exclusive-or operation, the basic mathematical properties allow us to compute
missing input by trivial computation. For example, if we know all inputs in z except one
and the f -outputs of all inputs of z but one, we can compute the missing input by xoring
all the given data, thus we do not need to call f . If the size of input is small, the attacker
will have some advantage in computation, although it does not work properly as the size
of input increases [12]. After the work done by Aumasson and Meier in [4], who were
able to generate zero-sum distinguishers for the 16-round version of Keccak, Boura and
Canteaut followed their ideas and achieved a positive result on the 18-round of Keccak in
[8]. The Keccak team has increased the number of rounds after these results were published
up to 24. They clearly state the problem in their note in [12], but still the complexity of
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computation is so high, that it does not effect the security claims of Keccak.
6.1.2 The generic algorithm
In this work we improve the results given by the generic algorithm by optimizing the
calculation of the system of equations. As a tool we use the SAT solver. Let us first present
the algorithm and then discuss why SAT solver can be applied. We are going to use the
same notations as in [12]:
• N is an integer;
• f is the hash function from n to m bits;
• Xi = [xi|f(xi)]T is a column vector with components the bits of xi, followed by the
bits of f(xi).
1. Take N random values xi, compute f(xi) and form Xi = [xi|f(xi)]T .
2. Compute the bitwise sum of the vectors Xi and call the sum A
3. Take p = n+m+ ε random values yi with 0 ≤ i < p and ε a small integer, compute
f(yi) and form Yi = [yi|f(yi)]T .
4. Solve the following linear system of n + m equations in the n + m + ε variables ai
over GF (2), with the bits of (Xi ⊕ Yi) serving as (fixed) coefficients:
Σ0≤i<pai(Xi ⊕ Yi) = A.
5. And at the last step of the algorithm we form the set Z, such that:
zi = {yi, if i < p and ai = 1; xi, otherwise }
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The common way to solve such kind of system is by using Gaussian elimination, but
let us examine the efficiency of the solution, with the help of the SAT solver tool. Special
feature of SBSAT solver allows to work with equations, containing XOR functions, so
we can proceed computing without really changing the structure of equation. However
converting these equations to CNF form, will require some time. This method will allow
us to obtain the solution much quicker than by calculating it with any traditional algebraic
methods.
6.2 Tools
As we have mentioned earlier, we are using SAT solvers as a tool in the discussed algo-
rithm. Although SAT solvers were initially developed to deal with the boolean satisfiability
problem, now they represent a very powerful tool, which can be used in a great variety of
areas. The following section describes the idea and the current situation in the SAT solvers
field, and explains the choice of the SAT solver for our experiment.
6.2.1 Definition
The satisfiability (SAT) is one of the basic problems in classical mathematics and com-
puter science. The goal is to define for a given formula whether the variable can be assigned
so that the formula becomes TRUE. The existence of such a solution makes the formula
satisfiable. If there is no possible way to evaluate the formula true, the problem is called
unsatisfiable. The important thing here is to obtain the certain answer, either positive or
negative. Sometimes the problem is mentioned as boolean satisfiability, which stressed the
idea of working with bits [47].
SAT was the first known example of an NP-complete problem. That means there is no
known algorithm, which efficiently solves all instances of SAT, and it is generally believed
that no such algorithm exists [47]. In recent years, some version of SAT problems, such
as 2-SAT and 3-SAT were redefined as solvable in polynomial time. Further, a wide range
42
of other naturally-occurring decision and optimization problems are transformed into in-
stances of SAT. A class of algorithms, called SAT solvers, can efficiently solve a large
enough subset of SAT instances useful in various practical areas, such as circuit design, au-
tomatic theorem proving and many others. By transforming problems, into SAT instances,
we can now solve them with an efficient tool. Extending the capabilities of these algorithms
is an ongoing area of research. However, no current such methods can efficiently solve all
SAT instances.
Considering cryptographic applications, SAT solvers are efficient enough in attacks on
hash function. For example, in [27] the authors analyze the performance of different SAT
solvers, which are working on the representation of the attack of Wang on MD and SHA
families. At this point SAT solvers appear as an actual tool of cryptanalysis. An important
feature is that we are able to turn up the parameters in the SAT solver in such a way that
it can be used much more efficiently and faster. Basically, they were capable of producing
attacks on MD4 and MD5 in the same manner as the original attacks were with the usage
of SAT solvers, though their work was much more time consuming. Another group of
researches developed a cryptographic tool, which uses SAT solver, to perform attack on
Keccak, one of the SHA-3 finalists [28]. Thus, as we can see from these examples, SAT
algorithms represent a powerful approach, which is constantly developing and improving.
6.2.2 SAT competition
Since 2002 a special competition for SAT designers takes place every year, and the best
SAT solvers in different categories are selected annually. There are three main classes, in
which the competitors can perform: industrial (application), crafted, and random. Numer-
ous designers present different versions of their products in several classes. After the jury of
the competition tests the performance of all the solvers on certain amount of instances, the
top three performers receive gold, silver or bronze medals. In each of the categories there
are also three different classes for unsatisfiable problems (UNSAT), satisfiable problems
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(SAT) and all the problems (UNSAT + SAT). There is also a conference, which follows
the competition, every couple of years, so that the SAT scientific community keeps the re-
searches up to date. As the organizing committee claims, the main purpose of the whole
competition is to identify new challenging benchmarks and to promote new solvers for the
propositional satisfiability problem (SAT) as well as to compare them with state-of-the-art
solvers [36].
In 2010, the organizers were also accepting solvers that can run the instances in the alge-
braic format, while usually the SAT solvers are working with so-called DIMACS format.
As we know, the instance of the problem to the SAT solver is the boolean formula. So,
generally the SAT solvers take as an input the representation in the conjunctive normal
form (CNF), which is basically the conjunction of disjunctions of boolean variables. The
DIMACS format was developed to easily show the structure of the formula. Let we see the
small example.
Example 1. The DIMACS format
c
c this is a comment
c
p cnf 3 2
1 -3 0
2 3 -1 0
This example represents the following boolean formula (x1∨¬x3)∧(x2∨x3∨¬x1) . The
CNF file start with comments, these are lines, beginning with the character c. Right after
the comments, there is the line ”p cnf nbvar nbclauses”, indicating that the instance is in
CNF format; nbvar is the exact number of variables, appearing in the file, and nbclauses is
the exact number of clauses in the expression, and then each particular clause is described.
The index of the variable is presented as a positive number, if it is just the variable itself in
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the clause, and as a negative number if it comes as a negation of the variable in the clause.
Each clause ends with symbol of 0. DIMACS format is the most popular format among the
SAT solvers.
Another nuance of the recent competitions is that much more attention is given to the
parallelization question. Of course, we would like to obtain the solution of the problem
no, but it must not take too long. Thus, the organizers decided to promote both the solvers
that are quick and those which are more efficient in operation. An important fact is that the
organizing committee is keeping the competition alive and growing, as the new tracks and
rules are added every year. This ensures progress in the competition.
6.2.3 Some examples
Among the most popular SAT solvers we can name MiniSat. It is one of the first open-
source SAT solvers, specifically invented to help researchers and developers. MiniSat is
released under the MIT licence, and is currently s basis in the numerous projects. Together
with SatELite, MiniSat was recently awarded in the three industrial categories and one of
the ”crafted” categories of the SAT 2005 competition [37]. Also MiniSat represents the
core of the SAT solver, which we were trying to use at first for developing an attack. The
name of the SAT solver is SAT4j and it was released not long ago by one of the organizers
of the competition Daniel Le Berre. The main advantage of this particular SAT solver
for us is that it is represented as a Java library, which allows for easy implementation in
software. This SAT solver is now one of the participants of the SAT competition, so after
the conference this year, we can see how good it is among other candidates.
Besides, later while working on the algorithm for the attack, we have found out that
SAT4j is not convenient enough for our software. And we started to look for another SAT
solver, which can work not only with CNF form, but with other boolean functions. The
great solution for my problem was the SBSAT, that is presented in the next section.
45
In general, all the SAT solvers are well suited for working on the problems of interest,
and if performance is not a deterministic factor in the experiments, the winners of the recent
SAT competitions are an excellent choice. The following tables represents the results of
several last years of the SAT contest.
Table 7. 2010 SAT Race results.
NN Main track (CNF) Special track 1 (CNF parallel) Special track 2 (AIG seq)
1 CryptoMiniSat plingeling MiniSat++
2 lingeling ManySAT 1.5 kw-aig
3 SAT-Power ManySAT 1.1 NFLSAT
Table 8. 2009 SAT Race results. Application track.
NN Gold Silver Bronze
UNSAT precosat glucose lysat
SAT SATzilla I precosat MXC
ALL glucose precosat lysat
Table 9. 2009 SAT Race results. Crafted track.
NN Gold Silver Bronze
UNSAT clasp SATzilla2009-C IUT-BMB-SAT
SAT clasp SApperloT MXC
ALL SATzilla2009-C clasp IUT-BMB-SAT
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Table 10. 2009 SAT Race results. Random track.
NN Gold Silver Bronze
UNSAT SATzilla2009-R March hi NA
SAT TNM gNovelty2+ hybridGM3 / adapt2wsat2009++
ALL March hi SATzilla2009-R NA
6.2.4 SBSAT
Our new choice was the SBSAT, which stands for a state-based satisfiability solver, de-
veloped and maintained by students and faculty at the University of Cincinnati [38]. The
main difference of SBSAT from most of the SAT solvers is that it is working directly with
non-CNF input. The authors define the input format as Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs),
which represent complicated boolean formulas using only the operator if-then-else, con-
stants TRUE and FALSE, Boolean variables, and parentheses. They claim that BDD rep-
resentations are usually much more compact than truth tables [16]. THe other tunable
parameter is the search heuristics, which allows to users to experiment, investigating the
same problem [15].
In particular the SBSAT is working with the following input formats:
• CNF (Conjunctive Normal Form)
• DNF (Disjunctive Normal Form)
• BDD (SBSAT canonical form)




• XOR (Each conjoint is an XOR of conjoints)
Some of these formats were developed specifically for the research work on some particular
project in the University of Cincinnati, others represent basic forms like CNF, DNF and
XOR.
For this work, the ability to take the input in the XOR format was crucial, because of
the structure of equations in the chosen algorithm. The translation of these equation to the
CNF format by hand would be pretty difficult. Similar observations were made by Paweł
Morawiecki and Marian Srebrny in their paper [28] for their SAT-based preimage attack
on Keccak, when they had to obtain the CNF for the SAT solver, which they were using.
The whole process requires a lot of extra variables, leading to huge memory requirements
for real-size cases. The web-page by Mate Soos accurately describes the procedure of
converting algebraic normal form to CNF [42]. While choosing the SAT solver, we first
tried to work with these conversions and turning the equations in the CNF form. However
with the growth of dimensions the problem expanded, so the switch to the SBSAT was
made, reducing complexity of the process.
Also a very nice feature of the SBSAT solver is the ability to convert some formats into
others, which is convenient for different problems. Here is the table of the input formats
conversions [16].
Table 11. SBSAT input format conversion table ([16]).
NN CNF DNF BDD XOR
CNF yes no no no
DNF yes no no no
BDD yes no no no
XOR yes no no no
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To determine whether format A can be converted to format B, find the format of the input
you have in a row. for example, CNF, and the answer appears in the column with the format
you want to convert to, for example, XOR. The answer is negative, but if we try to do the
opposite thing, switching form XOR to CNF, it can be automatically converted by this type
of solver.
The proposed algorithm for zero-sum distinguishers contains the XOR representation of
the system of boolean equations. Thus, we used the SBSAT on XOR input. The format of
the input is very similar to the DIMACS format for CNF. The header is the following:
p xor max-var-number number of functions ,
where max-var-number defines the number of variables in the formula and number of func-
tions defines the number of equations. Here is an example.
Example 2. The XOR input format
p xor 6 3
x1 x2 x3 = 1
x1x2x3 = 1
x1x2x3 x2x3 x4x5x6 = 0
The equations in this example describe the following formulas:
• x1x2x3 = 1 is equal to equ(xor3(1, 2, 3), T ) and x1⊕ x2⊕ x3 = 1
• x1x2x3 = 1 is equal to equ(and3(1, 2, 3), T ) and x1&x2&x3 = 1
• x1x2x3x2x3x4x5x6 = 0 is equal to
equ(xor3(and3(1, 2, 3), and(2, 3), and3(4, 5, 6)), F )
and (x1&x2&x3)⊕ (x2&x3)⊕ (x4&x5&x6) = 0
Overall, we consider the SBSAT the right choice for the proposed algorithm, as it is




7.1 Part 1. Small case
For the first experiment we are referring the algorithm in [12], which allows to construct
a zero-sum distinguisher. We trace the algorithm step by step on the “toy” example. Let
assume that n = 3 and f(x) = x+ 6, where x ∈ {0, 2n}.
1. Take N random values xi, compute f(xi) and form Xi = [xi|f(xi)]T .
We get the following set of vectors X , where in each vector first 3 bits correspond to
the value of x and next 2 bits is the value of f(x):
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 1
2. Compute the bitwise sum of the vectors Xi and call the sum A:
Σ0≤i<NXi = A
In our example, A turns into the following vector
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A = (0 0 0 0 0 0)
3. Take p = n+m+ ε random values yi with 0 ≤ i < p and ε a small integer, compute
f(yi) and form Yi = [yi|f(yi)]T .
Let assume that n = 3,m = 3 and ε = 2, thus N = p. And we get p vectors Y :
0 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1
4. Solve the following linear system of n + m equations in the n + m + ε variables ai
over GF (2), with the bits of (Xi ⊕ Yi) serving as (fixed) coefficients:
Σ0≤i<pai(Xi ⊕ Yi) = A. (1)
Here we compute the bitwise XOR of Xi and Yi) and store it in the separate vector
B, which is in our example equals to
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
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As we have discussed earlier in Chapter 6, the SAT solver shall be used as a tool for
obtaining the solution of the system of equations. Let us examine the system, which
we can present to the SAT solver later.
Thus, our basic equation is:
Σ0≤i<paiB = A.
Important to remember is that Bi and A are vectors and ai are constants, thus we
need to take constant ai as an individual clause with every component of the vector
Bi and each chain of clauses equals to the corresponding value in the vector A. Thus
we receive the following formula:
(a1 ∧B11)⊕ (a2 ∧B21)⊕ ...⊕ (ap−1 ∧B(p−1)1) = A1
...
(a1 ∧B1N)⊕ (a2 ∧B2N)⊕ ...⊕ (ap−1 ∧B(p−1)N) = AN
As we are looking for the solution of the whole system of equations, all of the
statements should hold true at the same time. Now we need to turn that into special
format for the SAT solver. For the input format, which is used in the SAT solver,
we need to formulate the equations in terms of the variables. That means we need
to look specifically on each closure in every equation of the described system. To
simplify the formula we apply some basic rules of discrete math.
• x ∧ 1 = x (2)
• x ∧ 0 = 0 (3)
As Bij is a known value, we can apply rules (2) or (3), we get two cases:
(a) Bij = 0.
ai ∧ Bij = 0; For XOR statement this case does not matter, as 0 does not
influence on the value of XOR.
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(b) Bij = 1.
ai ∧Bij = ai
In this case, we include into the input file the corresponding variable, i.
Processing the whole formula in such a way, we get the file with XOR equations.
The .xor file contains the system of equations in the special input format for SB-
SAT (see Chapter 6 for details).
p xor 8 6
x3 x4 x7 x8 = 0
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 = 0
All other equations are trivial, thus they are discarded.










This result gives us the values of the coefficients ai in our system of equations and
they all equal to 1.
5. And at the last step of the algorithm we form the set Z, such that:
zi = {yi, if i < p and ai = 1; xi, otherwise }
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And now we can build the final set:
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 1
If we check the XOR of all the final vectors, we receive zero-vector.
At the same time, we can easily receive the unsatisfiable system, for example, for the
trivial case, where X = Y . The following example is done on the same dimensions, but
with other input values:
Table 11. Example 1. Trivial case, X = Y
X Y X ⊕ Y
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A : 0 0 0 0 0 0
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As we see here, the value of X ⊕ Y gives a zero-vector, which turns the system of
equations to the trivial equality 0 = 0. That confirms the output of the SBSAT solver, thus,
we are observing the trivial case. We can also see the other unsatisfiable case.
Table 12. Example 2. Unsatisfiable case
X Y X ⊕ Y
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
A : 0 0 0 0 0 0









0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1
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0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 1
Xoring z...
1 1 0 0 0 0
Check of the final vector: false
7.2 Part 2. Sets of small cases
The described algorithm finds some of the solutions that will have an important feature
such that:
Σ0≤i<Nzi = 0 and Σ0≤i<Nf(zi) = 0.
Basically, the algorithm decides on the given subsets, which input values will be taken in
the final solution. If we try all possible inputs of the same dimension, we will most likely
receive all solutions. To get the general picture of the whole process, first we try the small
samples, which we can easily track for the correctness. Then we do the middle cases, that
should show the complexity of the computations. And finally we proceed to the actual hash
functions with different variations on the number of rounds and parameters.
Let us first concentrate on how many subsets, which are xoring to 0, we can get working
with the vectors of some dimension n. For example, we take different inputs on 3 bits and
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the hashing function f generates the output of 3 bits. We need to check the condition that if
the subset of input vectors xors to 0, the corresponding subset of hashes of the input vectors
also xors to 0. If we want to go through all possible inputs, we receive 23 = 8 vectors of
the size 6 bits. To see what subsets will xor to 0, we need to check all possible variants,
which is 28. As the result we have the following table:
Table 13. Complexity of checking all the subsets for xoring to 0
n 2 3 4 5 6
input size 22 23 24 25 26
# of subsets 24 28 216 232 264
As you can see from the table 13, even for relatively small dimensions it is rather time
and resource consuming to check all the subsets to get the actual number of solutions.
Nevertheless, we calculated some examples, the following table shows the amount of the
subsets of vectors, which xor to 0.
Table 14. Number of the subsets, which xor to 0.
n|f(x) x+ 2 random f1 random f2
2 2 1 4
3 10 6 13
4 326 481 520
Comparing the data in the tables 13 and 14, we can conclude that the number of the
subsets xoring to 0 is approximately1/2n+1. The theoretical probability will be 1/2n.
Now, when we have the numerical results of the actual computation, we can proceed
with our algorithm, to test for accuracy. We run the algorithm on the different inputs. For
this part of experiment we generate the input in the following way:
1. Fix the input X: all the vectors of size n bits. Overall, 2n vectors.
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2. Take some subsets of X as input Y . According to the algorithm size of Y is equal to
p = n + m + ε, where n- number of the bits in the input vector, m - number of the
bits in the hash of the input vector, ε - small random number. Let assume that n = m,
still we have a parameter ε to play with. In this experiment we try different amount
of vectors in Y , from 2n−1 to 2n − 1, so that overall the number of variants will be
ΣCiN i!, where i = [N/2, N − 1] and N = 2n.
This formula consists of the number of subsets of i vectors out of N, which is CiN ,
and the number of all permutation inside each subsets, which is i!.
3. Take every combination of X and Y as an input. Thus, we get a relatively large
amount of inputs for even small dimensions.
After generating all the input files, we run a script, which takes every input file one by
one, runs the algorithm on that input, runs the SBSAT for getting the solution of the system
of equations, then creates a possible solution from the results received by the SAT solver
and checks its correctness. We collect the results of these experiments in table 15.
Table 15. Results of the second part of the experiment.
n|f(x) x+ 2 random f
2 1 1
3 3 1
The other possible approach for this range of dimensions would be not to fix X or try
couple of variations on the size of the vector. Although the dimensions are tiny, when we
try all possible combinations, we easily receive a hundred thousand files to process. And
as we observe from the character of the growing complexity, for the larger dimensions it is
computationally impossible to check all the solutions.
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7.3 Part 3. Middle-size cases
The main part of the experiment was to deal with so called “toy”examples, and the main
aim of this was to understand the approach and to automate the process of computation.
Before we proceed to the samples, which are of the size of the actual hash function, we
also want to check the algorithm on several average size examples to obtain the overall
statistics. As we can conclude from the part 2 even for small dimension to check all possible
combinations of the inputs becomes very difficult, so this will not be performed.
One of the important details in this part is that as we increase the dimension n, we have
more possible input vectors out of 2n scope. That is why we can choose different combi-
nations of vectors in X and Y , so that they do not intersect. Again we are playing with
the size parameters, defined by sizes of the input vectors, hashes and ε different dimension.
According, to these ideas, for the experiments in this part we have tried several approaches.
One part of the input samples has followed the pattern n = m and the other was dealing
with the cases, where n < m with different values of parameter ε and the size of difference
between n and m. In similar way as in the main part of the experiment, two “toy”hash
functions were used. The dimensions of the samples varied from 8 to 32. Table 16 sum-
marizes the achieved results of this part of the experiment. Values are represented as i/j,
where i is the number of solutions for the cases, where n = m, and j is the number of
solutions, where n < m. As discussed above, the exhaustive search of all the solutions was
not performed, only random samples on 9 files for the first case (n = m) and 18 files for
the other one.
Table 16. Results of the third part of the experiment.






As we can conclude from the table above, the more random are the values of the hash-
function, the harder it is to find the solution of the problem. On the other hand, for the
simplified case, where n = m, solutions can be found even when doing relatively small
amount of test cases (9 for each dimension).We can see the general tendency in behaviour
of this method, but let us proceed to the real-size hashes and hash functions to see how the
algorithms works in the real world.
7.4 Part 4. Full-size hash cases
The experiments in the previous parts show that the algorithm is actually working and
gives correct solutions. Now we can switch to the full-length hash functions and try dif-
ferent kinds of experiments. In the similar way as in case of middle-size hashes, we work
with 2 cases, where n = m and n < m. As we know the requirements of the competition
suppose 4 standard sizes of the output: 224, 256, 384 and 512 bytes. If we plug in these
numbers to the dimensions required by the algorithm, the sizes of the system of equation
explode and that makes the SAT solver work for an indefinite period of time. Thus, we
are working with just some amount of bytes to represent the value of hash, but taking into
consideration all possible hash-function outputs. From this point we receive an extra varia-
tion in the experiments, because bytes can be selected from different part of the hash value
(least significant bytes or most significant bytes).
At first, we did the experiments on Keccak and then switched to BMW. Now we are
going to discuss the results of the experiments and the difficulties encountered.
7.4.1 Keccak
Initially, when we have started working on the algorithm, the small test cases were
used to check the correctness of the chosen strategy, but it was done with the so-called
“toy”functions. This served as a demonstration to see how the algorithm will work with
large inputs, when the actual hash function would be taken for the input. Nevertheless, in
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practice this approach was not quite useful. Starting from n = 24 bits it is quite difficult to
receive the answer from the test program. On n = 64 bits the solver is unable to find the
solution, the program automatically stops the process. The problem is that with the increase
of the size of input, the boolean formula given to the SAT solver is growing progressively.
The following table gives an estimate of the size of formula for each tested dimension.
Table 17. Sizes of the boolean formula, given to SBSAT






At this point it is important to mention that we are working with the XOR representation
of input, the similar CNF representation of the problem will increase the number of vari-
ables for each dimension four times and the number of clauses will increase by (number of
clauses) ∗2T , where T is an average number of variables in each clause. Even with these
characteristics, running time of the test program for dimensions of n = 24, n = 32 is up to
several hours. Basically, if we estimate n as 2k, average number of clauses and number of
variables is close to 2k+1.
Let us proceed to the organization of the experiment. We have been running the algo-
rithm on different dimensions, specified above. As we can conclude from the previous
results, we can not use the whole value, produced by the hash functions, as it yields the
large amount of bits. Thus, we decided to take just some subset of bits from the generated
hash, which allows us to play with the positions of the bits. Following the general con-
cepts, two variants were chosen to take m most significant bits for one series of test cases
and m least significant bits for the other series. As discussed above (Chapter 4), Keccak
has round-based structure, that allows us to apply the algorithm to the different versions of
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it, from 1 up to all 24 rounds. Overall, the experiments included different variations and
combinations of the following parameters:
• dimensions of n and m
• number of rounds in Keccak
• different versions of Keccak with the output size of 224, 256, 384 and 512 bits.
• positions of the bits, takes as the hash value from the full-sized hash
• N number of input vectors
Unfortunately, the algorithm did not show any significant results. While working with
the actual hash-function, it was not able to find any distinguishers. These results give credit
to the hash function itself and thus does not affect negatively any of the security claims of
the authors. As far as explanation of the results of the experiment we see 2 main issues:
the tricky structure of the Keccak algorithm, which includes a lot of permutations and
constants, and the complicated boolean formula, which represents the system of equations.
Another aspect may be the technical characteristics of the testing machine (regular laptop:
Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU P9300 2.26GHz, RAM: 4Gb, ROM: 320Gb), i.e., some
parallelization in SAT solver would provide faster results. All test programs were written in
Java, using the code from the original submissions to SHA-3 hash competition for getting
the hash values and SBSAT solver as a tool for obtaining the solution of the system of
equations (see appendix C for details).
7.4.2 Blue Midnight Wish
The second function, which we are investigating, is Blue Midnight Wish. The experi-
ments for this function were organized in the similar manner as for Keccak, but the impor-
tant point is that because of the structure of BMW, that does not include rounds in general,
only in one part of the compression function, we do not test reduced versions of BMW.
62
Still BMW is designed to produce 4 different sizes of the output (224, 256, 384 and 512
bits). Even though the design of BMW does not have the repetitive round-structure, one of
its’ compression functions has a special parameter for so-called complex rounds. Basically,
this parameter allows to vary the output, but as BMW has not succeeded for the third round
and due to the lack of time, we save this option for the possible future work.
Nevertheless, experiments were performed with such parameters as size of input N and
dimensions n andm. Also, as discussed above, the algorithm was tried on both most signif-
icant bits and least significant bits. But even with different variations of these parameters,
the results were not optimistic. All the results follow one of two possible scenarios:
• The SAT solver says that the boolean formula is unsatisfiable, thus the system of
equations does not have a solution.
• The problem is satisfiable, but after the proposed solution is built, part of the vectors
are taken from input X , others taken from Y and after that the solution is added by
the rest of the vectors from X to match the sizes, the check of the final vector does
not xor to zero. That is an incorrect solution.
The third case in this list will be the most wanted variant - a correct solution, but running
the algorithm on random samples did not show such a result. There are several possible
reasons for this:
• As we discussed above, it is impossible to check all the solutions for the relatively
large dimensions,as it requires great computational effort. That is why random sam-
ples have been tested, however these samples did not have any solutions.
• The actual number of solutions is very small, as we have estimated earlier, it is ap-
proximately 2−(n+1), where n is the size of input, thus it is very difficult to find any.
• The proposed method is nondertermetistic, thus it is quite obvious that it does not
give a correct solution all the time.
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• It might be that the selected functions are strong enough to resist this algorithm,
which gives a good characteristic to the designs of the functions.
Thus, we can say that for the Keccak and BMW the proposed algorithm does not find
zero-sum distinguishers even on reduced versions, although it is able to find the solutions





The main goal of the thesis was to investigate the selected hash functions and to see
if any significant vulnerabilities could be found. We decided to work on such aspect as
search of zero-sum distinguishers with the generic algorithm. The proposed algorithm
was fully investigated and properly tested on both Keccak and Blue Midnight Wish hash
functions. We have modified the algorithm, using SAT solver as a tool. Specifically, we
were working with SBSAT, which we consider the most suitable solver for this problem
after investigating various popular SAT solvers. Unfortunately, the received results were
not so optimistic, although the algorithm was working properly for “toy”examples. Among
several possible reasons, we consider the following as the most important ones:
• The proposed algorithm has a very generic structure, which might also reflect its
nondeterministic behaviour.
• The designs of the selected hash functions are quite new and mathematically compli-
cated, that makes them resistant to generic algorithms.
• The SAT solver was working very slow for large dimensions.
Thus, based on our experimental results on reduced versions of the functions, we can
conclude that this kind of generic algorithm cannot seriously affect the full versions of
hash functions, which proves that security claims of Keccak and BMW hold. At the same
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time this does not affect negatively the use of distinguishers. The general opinion is that
some of the distinguishers are powerful enough, while others just point out some inter-
esting mathematical properties and are not capable of turning into some serious attack.
Nevertheless, distinguishers are the important part of the modern cryptanalysis.
8.2 Possible future work
The topic of this thesis is quite new and there might be numerous ways to develop the
described approach. For the possible future work, that arises in this area, we present the
following ideas:
• Improve the generic algorithm, making it more function specific, which would re-
quire serious investigation of each of the compression functions in the particular
hash function.
• Improve the performance of the algorithm by the parallelization of the implementa-
tion, that will allow to receive the results faster and increase the dimensions of the
test examples.
• Try to use another SAT solver, that would be able to work with the boolean formula
of the larger sizes in order to increase the dimensions of the inputs.
• Try the same approach on the compression functions of the hash functions, because
the vulnerabilities in the compression functions can show the weaknesses of the full
hash.
Certainly, there might be other algorithms able to determine zero-sum distinguishers,
applicable for the same hash functions that can help in the analysis of the functions. Es-
pecially with 5 finalists selected, every detail of analysis is quite important, since a fully
secure standard is highly desirable. Based on the current situation among the finalists,
Keccak has very high potential to win the competition.
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[30] Ivica Nikolič, Josef Pieprzyk, Przemysław Sokołowski, Ron Steinfeld. Ro-






[32] NIST. Announcing the Development of New Hash Algorithm(s) for the Revision
of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 180-2, Secure Hash Standard,
Federal Register. Vol. 72, No. 14. January 23, 2007 http://csrc.nist.gov/
groups/ST/hash/documents/FR\_Notice\_Jan07.pdf
[33] NIST. Status Report on the Second Round of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash Algo-
rith Competition. February, 2011 csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/
ir7764/nistir-7764.pdf
[34] NIST. Announcing Request for Candidate Algorithm Nominations for a New Crypto-
graphic Hash Algorithm (SHA-3) Family, Federal Register. Vol. 72, No. 212. Novem-
ber 2, 2007 http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/documents/
FR\_Notice\_Nov07.pdf
[35] Official web-site of Blue Midnight Wish hash function. http://www.q2s.ntnu.
no/sha3\_nist\_competition/start
[36] Official web-site of the SAT competition. http://www.satcompetition.
org/
[37] Official web-site of MiniSat. http://minisat.se/
[38] Official web-site of SBSAT. http://www.cs.uc.edu/˜weaversa/SBSAT.
html
[39] Bart Preneel. Hash functions: theory and practice. Asiacrypt 2010, ICICS 2010 and
Indocrypt 2010 2010. http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/˜preneel/
71
[40] SHA-3 finalists. Stanisław P. Radziszowski. March, 2011. http://www.cs.rit.
edu/˜spr/gdn2010/
[41] Andrew Regenscheid, Ray Perlner, Shu-jen Chang, John Kelsey, Mridul Nandi,
Souradyuti Paul. Status Report on the First Round of the SHA-3 Cryptographic Hash
Algorithm Competition. September, 2009. http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/
ST/hash/sha-3/Round1/documents/sha3\_NISTIR7620.pdf
[42] Mate Soos. Homepage. ANF to CNF conversion. http://www.msoos.org/
anf-to-cnf-conversion
[43] Douglas R. Stinson. Cryptography: theory and practice. Third edition. CRC Press.
2006.
[44] Soren Thomsen. Pseudocryptanalysis of the Original Blue Midnight Wish. Fast Soft-
ware Encryption 2010, Proceedings, volume 6147 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 304-317. Springer, 2010. http://www.springerlink.com/
content/05663v32l1k34181/
[45] Soren Thomsen. A near collision attack on the Blue Midnight Wish com-
pression function. 2008. http://www2.mat.dtu.dk/people/S.Thomsen/
bmw/nc-compress.pdf
[46] Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun Lisa Yin and Hongbo Yu. Finding Collisions in the
Full SHA-1. In CRYPTO’05, volume 3621 of Lecture Notes in Computer






Here we provide the logical functions and constants, that are used in the compression
functions of Blue Mignight Wish hash function.
Figure 8. The design of f0 compression function
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Figure 9. The design of f1 compression function
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Figure 10. The design of f2 compression function
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As we refered earlier, Daniel Bernstein and the VAMPIRE lab presented the measume-
nent of performance of various hash functions on different machines. Specifically, they
show the results of SHA-3 candidates, working with all claimed versions of the finalists,
and SHA-2 (both SHA-256 and SHA-512). So, the compelete list includes the following
hashes with specified parameters[45]:
• BLAKE-32: BLAKE with 32-bit words, 10 rounds, and 256-bit output
• BLAKE-64: BLAKE with 64-bit words, 14 rounds, and 512-bit output
• BLAKE-256: BLAKE with 32-bit words, 14 rounds, and 256-bit output
• BLAKE-512: BLAKE with 64-bit words, 16 rounds, and 512-bit output
• Grøstl with 256-bit output; tweaked starting in supercop-20110426
• Grøstl with 512-bit output; tweaked starting in supercop-20110426
• JH with 224-bit output
• JH with 256-bit output
• JH with 384-bit output
• JH with 512-bit output
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• Keccak[]=Keccak[r=1024,c=576,nr=24] with 1024-bit output; padding tweaked start-
ing in supercop-20110426
• Keccak[r=1152,c=448,nr=24] with 224-bit output; padding tweaked starting in supercop-
20110426
• Keccak[r=1088,c=512,nr=24] with 256-bit output; padding tweaked starting in supercop-
20110426
• Keccak[r=832,c=768,nr=24] with 384-bit output; padding tweaked starting in supercop-
20110426
• Keccak[r=576,c=1024,nr=24] with 512-bit output; padding tweaked starting in supercop-
20110426
• Skein-256-256 with 256-bit output (tweaked starting in supercop-20100924)
• Skein-512-512 with 512-bit output (tweaked starting in supercop-20100924)
• Skein-1024-1024 with 1024-bit output (tweaked starting in supercop-20100924)
The test cases were done for long and short messages (4096, 1536, 576, 64 and 8 bytes)
on more then 130 different architectures. One of the representations of the achieved results
is the graph, which is the superimposition of several curves, one curve per each hash func-
tion. The graph is supported by the set of tables, where rows contain values of the speed
measurements, one table for each lenght of the input message. The check points of each
measurement are the first quartile, the median and the third quartile. The sample of such
table you can find in the end of this appendix (for more details see [45]). According to
the experiments, in particular each machine has 6 characterizing tables, but we just don’t
list them all here. Another representation of the results contains the speed values for all
the machines on every function. This approach allows to make a comparison between the
candidates and their different versions.
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This work provides great statistical information and gives the feeling of the general speed
of the functions among the final 5. It seems that BLAKE and Skein are the fastest ones on
most of machines, which is not suprising, by the way, because one of the claim of the
Schneiers’ team was the high speed of Skein. At the same time we should say that Keccak
does well enough also on different configurations, which allows it to stay in the middle.
For more interesting results and comparisons, see [45]
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Table 18. Sample of the experiment: Cycle/byte for long messages
quartile median quartile hash
20.21 20.21 20.21 skein512
23.32 23.38 23.39 blake32
24.26 24.29 24.29 skein256
26.18 26.19 26.20 skein1024
26.46 26.52 26.58 blake64
26.81 26.81 26.84 blake256
29.83 29.86 29.89 blake512
33.24 33.33 33.43 keccakc448
35.49 35.53 35.57 keccakc512
37.80 37.81 37.83 sha512
38.27 38.29 38.31 keccak
47.72 47.73 47.98 keccak768
51.05 51.06 51.08 jh224
51.06 51.07 51.07 jh384
51.06 51.07 51.07 jh512
51.07 51.07 51.20 jh256
60.54 60.55 60.55 sha256
66.41 66.42 66.43 keccak1024
115.18 115.30 115.37 groestl256
182.04 182.21 182.28 groestl512
amd64, 1000MHz, Intel Atom N455 (106ca), h2atom, SUPERCORP version:
2011-04-29, benchmark dates: 2011-05-03 - 2011-05-14
